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OMBUDSMAN, TRIBUNALS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE SECTION 
 
Administrative justice in Wales: a new egalitarianism? 
 
Sarah Nason 
Prifysgol Bangor University, Wales 
 
ABSTRACT 
Administrative justice systems are under a variety of pressures, in particular austerity inspired 
civil justice reform. I argue that such pressures do not necessitate the decline of administrative 
justice, and that a developing Welsh model has cross-jurisdictional appeal, especially to legal 
orders currently lacking a relevant organisational centre and joined-up approach. I examine the 
efficacy of existing conceptions of administrative justice and delineate a developing Welsh 
approach grounded in egalitarian principles. The nascent Welsh model emphasises reforming 
administrative justice hierarchies so that they work harmoniously with regulatory and value-
promoting parts of the system, focusing on user perspectives, and tackling the risks of less 
transparent forms of bureaucratic decision-making. 
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Introduction 
Common-law administrative justice systems have largely grown up ad hoc in response to 
contemporary problems in public administration (Hare 1995), pressure from influential legal 
and political elites (Sterett 1997) and government policy priorities (Thomas 2016). There are 
models that could be established were the slate of history entirely clean, but such is unlikely to 
be the case. The nation that has brought us the world’s best quality slate, Wales of course, is at 
a key stage in the emergence of its own distinctive administrative justice system, providing a 
case-study with lessons for other jurisdictions. Slate cannot be created in isolation; it morphs 
from existing features under pressure and heat. So too an administrative justice system. Current 
pressures are forging new attributes to administrative justice across the common-law world. 
These pressures include; austerity, modernising civil justice, political and constitutional 
changes (shrinking the state, new forms of nationalism and resultant mistrust in globalised 
values), evolving visions of what citizens expect in their interactions with state bureaucracies, 
and disbanding of bodies such as the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) and 
Australian Administrative Review Council, notable for their pursuit of ‘holistic’ administrative 
justice. I argue that this does not necessitate the decline of administrative justice, and that a 
developing Welsh model has cross-jurisdictional appeal, especially to legal orders currently 
lacking a relevant organisational centre and joined-up approach. I examine the efficacy of 
existing conceptions of administrative justice, moving then to delineate a developing Welsh 
approach grounded in egalitarian principles. The nascent Welsh model also emphasises 
reforming administrative justice hierarchies so that they work harmoniously with regulatory 
and value-promoting parts of the system, focusing on the user perspective, and tackling the 
risks of less transparent forms of bureaucratic decision-making.
 
Constitutional context  
The first phase of Welsh devolution was primarily executive. However, the Government of 
Wales Act 2006 gave a redefined National Assembly for Wales (the Assembly) powers to enact 
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laws, known as Measures, in fields which could be conferred piecemeal under Legislative 
Competence Orders negotiated between Welsh Ministers and the UK Government and 
confirmed by the UK Parliament. The 2006 Act also provided for the Assembly to gain power 
to pass Acts (instead of Measures) in subject areas (instead of fields), with scope for 
subordinate legislation to expand competence; a move triggered by a 2011 referendum.  
Whilst there has been no formal devolution of responsibility for ‘justice’, the Assembly and 
Welsh Government have responsibility for most public administration and this means that 
many aspects of administrative justice are devolved. At the time of writing the Assembly has 
competencies to make laws in 21 subjects, primarily concerning the relationship between 
citizens and the state (under the 2006 Act Part 4 and Schedule 7). Alongside these competencies 
the Assembly and Welsh Government have developed redress mechanisms to ensure that laws 
are enforced and maladministration is addressed. 
Since the Sixteenth Century the public law of Wales has been the public law of England and 
Wales (Gardner 2016), meaning that both the law made by the UK Parliament that only affects 
England and the law made by the Assembly that only affects Wales are parts of the law of 
England and Wales. Section 108 of the 2006 Act provides that an Assembly Act applies to 
Wales, but extends over England and Wales. This gives courts in Wales and England authority 
to enforce Welsh laws, thus maintaining a unified legal jurisdiction for the time being.  
The St David’s Day announcement (UK Government 2015) recommended that Wales move 
to a ‘reserved powers’ model. The subsequent draft Wales Bill 2015 was criticised because it 
appeared to roll-back legislative competencies already devolved (Wales Governance Centre 
and the Constitution Unit 2016). Its logic and consistency were questionable especially given 
its format of amending the existing conferred powers model rather than starting afresh; this 
also perpetuates the legacy of executive devolution. Welsh Government responded by 
producing its own Government and Laws in Wales Bill; this set out a vision for a more long-
lasting settlement for Wales, with a clearer divide between respective competencies and a set 
of deferred matters, including ‘justice’ to be devolved from 1 March 2026. This setting out the 
direction of travel also included provisions for the immediate recognition of a distinct Welsh 
legal jurisdiction, and for moves towards establishing a separate legal jurisdiction in the longer-
term (Welsh Government 2016a). At the time of writing, the revised Wales Bill 2016 attempts 
to deal with these concerns by rationalising some reservations and reducing the legal hurdles 
that must be surmounted to establish Assembly legislative competence. However, it still lacks 
a coherent set of constitutional principles underpinning the division of reserved and non-
reserved powers and does not fully address the issue of a distinct or separate Welsh legal 
jurisdiction; it refers instead to a distinct body of Welsh law. As it stands it is not a clear and 
accessible piece of legislation and could complicate and thereby prolong the process of 
enacting law applicable in Wales. This seems particularly disappointing at a time when other 
innovative steps have been suggested to improve the form and accessibility of such law. The 
Law Commission has recommended the consolidation of some existing Welsh law, and the 
potential codification of entire areas of law, as realistic options for making Welsh law more 
accessible as it increasingly differs from law applicable in England and Wales, and in England 
alone (Law Commission 2016). For the time being it can be said that there are some distinctive 
features of the Welsh jurisdiction, but this does not necessarily render it a distinct legal 
jurisdiction; the Assembly may indeed be the ‘only’ primary legislature without a legal 
jurisdiction. An important point to note, especially for readers from other jurisdictions, is that 
however the Welsh ‘jurisdiction’ is classified (e.g. emergent, distinctive, distinct) it is not a 
small legal jurisdiction on a global scale. Rather England and Wales is a particularly large 
jurisdiction.  
 
Conceptualising administrative justice  
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Despite continued wrangling over political recognition of a separate Welsh jurisdiction and the 
potential for ‘justice’ functions to be further devolved, many, perhaps even most, aspects of 
administrative justice already operate on a distinctly Welsh basis, therefore catalysing the 
development of a Welsh conception.  
In this regard, concepts function as mediating devices between the real world and our 
understanding of it by constituting an attempt to render explicit what is already implicit in our 
common understanding of a social practice. They are often presented at a broad and abstract 
level and are hard to disagree with. By way of example, Adler’s concept of administrative 
justice is that it is ‘the justice inherent in administrative decision-making’ (Adler 2003).  
Conceptions refine concepts; they enable us to see in detail how an abstract ideal plays out 
in certain circumstances within a polity (Dworkin 1998, pp.70–71 and 90–96; Nason 2016, 
Chs.1 and 9). Traditional administrative law conceptions of administrative justice are 
associated with the specific qualities of administrative law, looking from the ‘top down’ 
focusing on the decisions of senior courts and to a lesser extent those of tribunals and 
ombudsmen. On the other hand, justice in administration conceptions are concerned with the 
day-to-day activities and decisions of public bodies. Nowadays these conceptions are largely 
seen as complementary. But it is telling that a past Welsh tendency towards a narrower 
administrative law conception (Nason 2015, para 2.14) has led to common perceptions of 
administrative justice being seen either as a matter for tribunals and courts alone, or as a matter 
of public administration rather than of justice per se. This has meant that the significance of 
certain bodies such as Commissioners, to the broader evolution of justice in Wales has not 
always been appreciated.  
Part of this limited awareness is likely due to the longer-term lack of a justice function 
within Welsh Government. A Justice Policy Team was established in 2014, but with only four 
staff it is already stretched. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales has argued that a 
‘dedicated justice function’, either provided by the Ministry of Justice or devolved, is a matter 
of priority, ‘to enable legislation to operate effectively’ (Judiciary of England and Wales 2016). 
A Report by Cardiff University recommended creating a Ministry of Justice ‘Welsh Centre of 
Expertise’ (Wales Governance Centre 2016). In its ‘Legacy Report’, the Committee for 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Wales (CAJTW) recommended that, ‘the Justice Policy 
capability of the Welsh Government be further expanded to promote greater consistency across 
all policy areas’ (CAJTW 2016, recommendation 17).  
 
Understanding the culture of administrative justice  
Administrative justice has a cultural dimension, and a fruitful direction for improving our 
understanding is to consider how to shift conceptions of the subject matter away from the 
limited cultures with which it has hitherto been associated (Douglas 1978).  
Halliday and Scott have produced a cultural typology of administrative justice based on 
Grid-Group theory (Halliday and Scott 2010). These dimensions reflect the answers to two 
questions; ‘who am I?’ (Group) and ‘how should I behave?’ (Grid). This leads to the production 
of four models of cultural bias that are pluralistic but exhaustive extremes of social life. A 
cultural bias colours every aspect of one’s life; in this case views about the justness of one’s 
interaction with state bureaucracies.  
A Bangor Report on Welsh Administrative Justice suggests that so-called fatalist and 
hierarchical cultures are significant in Wales (Nason 2015, para 2.15–2.17). Fatalism is 
associated with citizens feeling constrained and controlled by societal norms and issues of rank, 
role and status. There is a sense of powerlessness which plays out in limited challenges to 
public decision-making. Such a culture within Wales stems from the historical notion of public 
servants as superiors. Some evidence for this includes that judicial review claims per head in 
Wales are lower than in the English regions; the same may be true of other redress mechanisms, 
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though no large-scale analysis has been conducted (Nason 2015, pp. 104–111). There is a risk 
that underlying fatalism could lead to reduced public confidence in administrative justice, yet 
formally the public sector remains wedded to a hierarchical approach. Under this latter 
conception there is respect for the authority and expertise of public decision-makers finding 
expression in a bureaucratic form of administrative justice based on following rules set down 
by superiors with limited room for discretion.  
Other cultural set-ups are available. For instance, a more egalitarian culture could be 
understood as one of partnership between public decision-makers and citizens, with an 
enhanced focus on the fair treatment of individuals. In an egalitarian culture, the citizen is a 
partner in the decision-making process and there is less deference to specialist expertise. This 
culture privileges decision-making by consensus and seeks to equalise the position of all those 
in the relevant group; achievement of which requires a high degree of citizen participation. 
However, it is not without risks; whereas fatalists feel powerless in the face of bureaucracy, 
egalitarians may be positively distrustful of authority and expertise (Thompson, Ellis and 
Wildavsky 1990). Egalitarians can exploit the presence, or perceived presence, of a large body 
of fatalists, seeking to de-stabilise established hierarchies without any comprehensible 
alternatives to replace them (see Brexit, the rise of UKIP in Wales, and the ‘Trump’ 
phenomenon as examples of this). There is then ideally some counterpoint where fatalists 
become more engaged, and the degree of consensus between officials and citizens improves 
by reforming established hierarchies rather than dismantling them. The challenge in Wales, 
and elsewhere, is to design processes that facilitate this engagement. 
 
The poor fit of traditional conceptions of administrative justice  
Whilst Wales demonstrates examples of Mashaw’s familiar tripartite analysis – bureaucratic 
rationality, professional judgement, and value defining approaches (Mashaw 1983) – there is 
a less easy relationship with marketized accounts of administrative justice.  
Given New Public Management (NPM) models of public administration, Adler proposed 
three further conceptions of administrative justice (Adler 2003). Managerialism gives 
autonomy to public sector managers who bear the responsibility for achieving prescribed 
standards of service in an efficient way, in return they are subject to performance audit and 
performance management indicators. Consumerism is a model more focused specifically on 
the individual citizen subject to administrative decision-making. The system revolves around 
consumer satisfaction. Public bodies should be responsive to citizen dissatisfaction and levels 
of service are defined and ensured by documents such as consumer or customer charters. 
Within Adler’s marketization model the focus is not just on the citizen as a consumer, but also 
as a customer with a choice between competing services. The public body is accountable to the 
citizen not through the citizen’s engagement, but to the market itself with the possibility of the 
citizen-customer defecting to another provider. 
Whilst Adler sees the NPM conceptions as distinct, if inter-acting accounts, Halliday argues 
that managerial autonomy, citizens or consumer charters, and the marketization of public 
services are part of the same whole and thus cannot exist, or at least cannot function effectively, 
in the absence of one constituent element (Halliday 2004). This view may cause problems for 
Wales where it could be said that managerialism and consumerism are embraced whilst 
marketization is rejected. The Williams Commission on Public Services in Wales noted, ‘…in 
Wales, public service delivery is driven by accountability and dialogue, not consumer choice’ 
(Williams 2014, para 4.10). The Welsh model for improving performance relies implicitly on 
scrutiny, accountability and engagement mechanisms rather than on consumer choice; ‘in the 
absence of a market model continuous improvement must be driven through effective 
performance management and improved regulation’ (Williams 2014, para 1.43). The Welsh 
state sector is bigger when compared with England and Scotland, and the inapplicability of a 
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marketization model implies that there is less choice. The lack of relevant choice underscores 
the need for appropriate mechanisms through which public decision-making can be challenged. 
This makes the ombudsman function and its placement between citizen and state especially 
important. 
Whilst Wales largely rejects marketization in devolved administrative justice, recent 
austerity policies and new forms of marketization and related professionalism are leading to 
some re-crafting of decision-making in the largest non-devolved area, the social welfare 
context. Many countries have instigated reforms whereby lower governmental bodies (e.g., 
municipalities, regional, local and devolved authorities) have been given more powers over 
policy development, and more discretion in individual cases, in the domain of social welfare. 
A rationale for this is that such bodies are more easily influenced by financial incentives; 
increasing their powers and responsibilities ties-in with austerity politics and the related 
subsequent use of market mechanisms to realise welfare policy objectives. Even where 
decision-making remains ultimately the responsibility of central government (as it does with 
most social welfare decisions in the UK), the background of cost-cutting leads to the same 
broad consequence, namely the growth of often mandatory but informal initial assessments and 
mandatory administrative review, with either or both being undertaken by a private contractor.  
Despite some Welsh rhetoric, market mechanisms are utilised in the devolved social welfare 
context. In 2013 discretionary payments under the Social Fund (created by the Social Security 
Act 1986) were abolished and replaced by a new scheme under which payments to meet special 
needs (primarily of claimants receiving means tested benefits) would become the responsibility 
of local authorities. In Wales the relevant Discretionary Assistance Fund (DAF) is administered 
by a private contractor (Northgate Public Services). Dissatisfied claimants must first seek an 
internal review by the DAF team. If sought, a second stage review will be determined by the 
Family Fund Trust (a UK wide charity). CAJTW recommended that Welsh Government 
provide more widely available information about this scheme and that Ministers consider 
whether onward appeals ought to be transferred to the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales 
(PSOW) (CAJTW 2016, recommendation 31). Welsh Government responded that feedback 
suggests the existing appeals process works well. The DAF falls within the jurisdiction of the 
PSOW with respect to complaints. On the other hand, the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman 
(SPSO) has jurisdiction to conduct an independent review of decisions made under the Scottish 
Welfare Fund; this is more akin to an appeal than a complaint and represents an evolution of 
the traditional ombudsman function (Nason 2015, p. 61).   
It is arguable that such developments in the administration of social welfare call for a new 
species of professional judgement, ensuring that decision-making is centred on the specific 
case, reducing bureaucracy and increasing the professional discretion of the initial decision-
maker. This has positive connotations, but when coupled with the need to save resources it has 
sometimes tended to result in stricter assessments and negative outcomes for applicants. It may 
be that the ambitions of professional judgement have turned out to be a bureaucratic design 
aimed at realising organisational goals. This suggests a return to a bureaucratic rationality 
culture with an austerity policy goal that suits the centralised state and market providers 
(Tollenaar 2017). These concerns should not lead us to be hyper-critical of administrative 
review processes, they are intended to be quick, cheap and simple, and as such beneficial to 
the individual applicant and the public body. That said, a range of studies conclude that despite 
the goal of simplicity, applicants fare better when legally represented even where the relevant 
regime has been designed specifically so that representation is not required. Recent research 
has found that this ‘representation premium’ is no longer evident in some contexts, but that 
representation in internal administrative review has an impact on the general standard of initial 
decisions by feeding back positively onto the quality of ongoing decision-making (Cowan et 
al forthcoming).  
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The contribution of tribunals also seems no longer to fit as comfortably within traditional 
conceptions of administrative justice. The two-tier structure created under the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act (TCEA) 2007 cemented the role of tribunals as judicial 
institutions, but this also led to a loss of government control. Thomas argues that this has 
prompted government to introduce reforms to reduce the number of cases passing out of its 
control and to cut costs; an initiative that has been exacerbated by austerity policies (Thomas 
2016). When this is coupled with political motivations towards eroding or abolishing appeal 
rights, the areas that have produced the most tribunal appeals – social security and immigration 
– have, to an extent, been de-tribunalised.  
Thomas argues that under what can now be considered as an ‘old’ model, tribunals were 
primarily concerned with dispute resolution under processes that could be described as ‘quasi-
judicial’. In general, paper-based systems were used for assembling case files and there was 
potential for oral and paper appeals with some legal aid available. Higher courts oversaw the 
operation of ‘inferior’ tribunals and judicial review by the Administrative Court was more 
widely available, whilst government made little or no effort to learn from tribunal decisions. 
Under a ‘new’ model, tribunals become as much concerned with dispute containment and 
avoidance as with dispute resolution, and government takes more responsibility for the right 
first time agenda by incorporating tribunal feedback. There is increasing use of ICT and online 
processing of appeals, with oral, paper and online appeal processes. The relationship between 
the Administrative Court and tribunals alters and the higher courts recognise the Upper 
Tribunal as a superior court of record; in many respect the apex of a new system of tribunal 
justice. As part of the general dispute avoidance rationale internal review is increasingly 
inserted before or instead of going to a tribunal. There is value in these developments and the 
‘new’ model is in principle concordant with the AJTC’s notion of a four-stage cycle of 
administrative justice; preventing disputes, reducing their escalation, resolving disputes and 
learning from them (AJTC 2012). However, the overall ethos of recent reforms may be one of 
reducing the accessibility of tribunals from the perspective of citizen-users in a manner more 
restrictive than is necessary to achieve proportionate justice.   
Within this picture, judicial review is limited to cases raising wide legal and policy concerns, 
or which disclose serious miscarriages of justice with no other route to redress. Tribunals, with 
the benefit of being able to re-appraise facts and the application of law, also become much 
harder to access, and administrative review grows. Administrative justice at the UK (and 
England) level then starts to look more like the US approach (Asimow 2016) than the ‘tribunal 
model’ applied in many common-law countries and derived from the UK system. The difficulty 
here is that we know very little about what longer-term costs and benefits this evolution may 
bring.  
The pressures leading to this morphing of models are not so prevalent within the devolved 
Welsh tribunals. Whilst reforms are ongoing, Welsh tribunals have not been harmonized into 
a two-tier structure and, at the time of writing, they are yet to develop sufficiently consistent 
features to identify a ‘Welsh’ model of tribunals, which can be compared to the ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
non-devolved models. One reason for this may be their comparatively small case-loads; a 
challenge for Wales is to ensure that cases are handled by judges and administrators having 
had the opportunity to develop sufficient expertise. 
 
New conceptions of administrative justice  
Conceptions of administrative justice are interpretive; they require us to work back and forth 
between principles and lived experience (Dworkin 1998). The ‘new’ model of tribunals, and 
perhaps of broader administrative justice that is developing must be guided and constrained by 
an underpinning set of principles. Elsewhere I have developed a set of Administrative Justice 
Principles for Wales (Nason 2015, pp.29–47) (the Bangor Principles). These Principles have 
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been adapted by CAJTW as a serviceable guide to a ‘distinct Welsh approach founded on a 
belief in social justice’ (CAJTW 2016, pp.43–45). Both Bangor and CAJTW Principles stress 
that administrative justice (including administrative redress) is not only about the provision of 
services and dispute resolution, but that relevant modes of engagement between individuals 
and public bodies are characteristic of approaches to social justice, rights, equality and liberty 
within a nation (O’Brien 2012).  
The Bangor Principles expand upon original ATJC Principles (AJTC 2010), for example by 
requiring that initial decision-making procedures as well as redress mechanisms should be 
appropriate, and that the administrative justice system itself should be coherent and consistent 
and comply with the full set of Principles. Decision-making is required to be effective as well 
as proportionate and efficient, thus capturing the importance of accuracy and recognising that 
achieving government policy goals is valued alongside more legalistic provisions. The Bangor 
Principles specifically require that people be treated as partners in the resolution of their 
disputes, that decisions are suitably democratic, and that decision-makers act with integrity.  
Under the CAJTW Principles ‘everyone has a fundamental right’ to be notified of decisions 
that affect them, to express views or voice complaints about decisions, and to an appeal or 
review. To that end, decision-making should comply with certain standards, largely drawn 
from the Bangor Principles; CAJTW additionally specifies that legislation under which 
decisions are made should be reasoned and coherent. The CAJTW Principles address ‘systems 
and procedures’ laying down requirements for appeal and review processes. These draw on the 
Bangor recommendations that such processes should demonstrate respect for human rights, 
equalities, sustainability and the needs of the most vulnerable; matters particularly important 
to social justice in Wales. Both Bangor and CAJTW add that informal dispute resolution should 
be available where appropriate and that unrepresented parties must not be disadvantaged. This 
reflects the changing nature of civil justice where alternative dispute resolution is increasingly 
recommended or required, and where the proportion of litigants in person has grown. CAJTW 
Principles address ‘values and behaviours’ chief among which are; respecting citizen’s rights 
and needs, keeping them informed, and parity of Welsh and English in decision-making and 
redress.  
CAJTW recommended that Welsh Government consider the Principles, offer its own 
proposals for consultation, and publish a final version that will ‘stand the test of time as the 
cornerstone of a distinctively Welsh approach to administrative justice’ (CAJTW 2016, 
recommendation 35). In response Welsh Government stated: ‘The proposed principles closely 
reflect existing values and legislative provisions that inform working practices. The CAJTW 
formulation will help provide a helpful source of guidance for the Welsh Government’ (Welsh 
Government 2016b).  
 
Reforming the hierarchy  
Not least given the Welsh Government’s cautious response, the best way to take the Principles 
forward is pragmatically and incrementally. This includes ensuring that hierarchical aspects 
of the Welsh model are updated, streamlined and made more sensitive to the circumstances of 
Wales including its evolving governance, laws and the context of legal practice.  
 
Engaging elected representatives and decision-makers  
Elected representatives are crucial here. CAJTW recommended that professional development 
in administrative justice issues is made available to Assembly Committee chairs and Assembly 
Commission staff and that cross-party focus groups be offered to AMs to examine the links 
between constituency work and administrative redress. It also recommended that the Assembly 
Commission supports a principled approach to new and existing redress mechanisms and that 
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a Committee could be nominated to scrutinise devolved tribunals and other ad hoc mechanisms. 
These recommendations could be set in motion alongside any forthcoming Welsh Government 
decision to take forward the Law Commission’s proposed programme of consolidating and/or 
codifying Welsh law 
A genuine cross-party political commitment is essential to progressing the Law 
Commission’s recommendations; such is also essential to the establishment of new redress 
mechanisms and their continuing operation. Initiatives should be properly funded with long-
term cost implications understood and committed to at the outset. 
It has been suggested that trust in government is low across much of Europe, including in 
the UK (Nason 2015, para. 3.2). In Wales the Williams Commission considered some public 
service performance to be ‘poor and patchy’ (Williams 2014, para. 1.52). It also suggested that 
there was, ‘a culture of defensiveness and passivity’ in Welsh public services (Williams 2014, 
para. 4.26). That said, the Report was wide-ranging and complex and identified areas of good 
practice and examples where public sector performance exceeded the needs of local 
communities. In response to Williams, Welsh Government outlined a 20-point action plan and 
set out a ‘vision’ for public services reform (Welsh Government 2014). This focuses on 
strengthening the democratic governance and delivery of services by improving leadership and 
performance management, and by implementing mergers and fostering collaborations, 
partnerships and the provision of shared services where appropriate. It also stresses that a 
stronger and more stable devolution settlement should assist in improving public service 
provision. It is questionable whether the Wales Bill 2016 will achieve this; though one advance 
is its definition of Welsh Devolved Authorities and non-exhaustive list of such bodies.  
Despite progress of the Welsh Government action plan, respondents to Bangor research 
gave continuing examples of public body defensiveness; most commonly relating to health, 
education, local government and the police (Nason 2015, para. 3.3). Insights into a forthcoming 
PSOW report suggest problems often include; a fear or refusal to admit that mistakes have been 
made; that the person in the department subject to the complaint had a role in formulating the 
public body’s response to it; and a lack of objectivity by senior officers responsible for signing 
off complaints (Nason 2016a).  
CAJTW recommended that leadership training in Welsh public bodies should promote a 
better understanding of administrative justice, including Local Authority Council members 
directly involved in decision making (CAJTW 2016, recommendation 4); and that work to 
strengthen audit, inspection and regulation should be supplemented with work to promote 
‘right first time’ decision making, effective redress mechanisms and organisational learning 
from complaints and appeals (CAJTW 2016, recommendation 3). Welsh Government 
responded that it is establishing a new approach to performance management intended to 
simplify and strengthen existing frameworks to enable authorities to respond to potential 
performance issues as they emerge (Welsh Government 2016b). CAJTW endorsed Welsh 
Government’s view that a set of shared values should be at the heart of public services 
provision. Welsh Government is focused on ensuring that citizen voices are heard and that 
those ‘ultimately making decisions on the provision of public services are chosen by, and 
accountable to, the people who elected them’ (Welsh Government 2014, p. 11).  
 
The Administrative Court in Wales  
Aside from the Court of Appeal and UK Supreme Court, the Administrative Court in Wales is 
top of the legal hierarchy of administrative justice in Wales. It has a dedicated Office dealing 
with the administration of the Administrative Court in Wales, and of Western (England) Circuit 
claims. Its main workload is judicial review; 89 per cent of its caseload in 2015.  
The Court has responsibility for three discrete statutory applications applying only in Wales; 
an appeal against the decision of the Adjudication Panel for Wales, an appeal against a decision 
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of the General Teaching Council for Wales, and an appeal against the decision of the Welsh 
Language Tribunal (WLT). It may be called upon to determine a ‘devolution issue’ after a 
reference in accordance with the 2006 Act. It also has a listing process that does not apply to 
Administrative Court Offices in England.  
At present a claimant may lodge their application in any Administrative Court Office in 
England and Wales, even if their case pertains wholly to Wales. The judiciary have made it 
clear that any Welsh case lodged outside Wales will be transferred to Wales and heard in Wales 
(Nason 2015, pp. 104–111). Nonetheless, the Administrative Court in Wales does not have 
absolute jurisdiction over cases pertaining to Wales. Welsh public law is developing differently 
from that of England at the legislative level, however, general common law principles of good 
administration remain fused with England, and the Wales Bill 2016 continues to reserve 
judicial review of administrative action. One wonders for how much longer such a reservation 
will be democratically and practically desirable; a more federalist solution could be developed 
whereby Wales has its own laws and procedures of judicial review, including developing 
nuanced case law principles, but within a floor and ceiling set by the UK Supreme Court.  
The Administrative Court in Wales has an egalitarian function as a symbol of community 
and equality (Thornberg 2011); it has played a role in educating the legal profession and the 
wider public about administrative law and administrative justice in Wales. Pragmatically, the 
size of government in Wales may make it easier to develop feedback loops between the 
Administrative Court and government departments, fostering organisational learning.  
Though caseloads are small compared to the scale of administrative decision-making, 
judicial review provides broad insight into the health of an administrative justice system. It is 
therefore concerning that there has been a decrease in non-asylum and immigration civil 
judicial review across the Administrative Court and that this reduction has been more marked 
outside London, including in Wales (Nason 2016b). Fewer judicial review claims are now 
issued outside London than was the case in 2009 when Administrative Court centres were 
opened in Birmingham, Cardiff, Leeds and Manchester. This is significantly due to reforms to 
legal aid and judicial review procedures that seem to have had a disproportionate effect on 
access to relevant legal services outside London. At least from the claimant side, the market 
for public law legal services in Wales appears to have shrunk just at a time in the progress of 
devolution that one might expect it to be expanding. This highlights the weakness of applying 
market models to the provision of advice services for the most vulnerable and economically 
disadvantaged. Similarly, whilst there has long been a strong moral and constitutional case for 
the Administrative Court in Wales, the ‘business’ foundation has been questioned due to the 
comparatively small caseload. Approximately half of the business of the Administrative Court 
in Wales originates from England; this has some negative bearing on debates around a separate 
legal jurisdiction for Wales, including a separate legal profession.   
Access to relevant legal advice and assistance, whether from private law firms or  
increasingly from charities and other voluntary organisations, is crucial both in terms of 
navigating and making the most of traditional court and tribunal based redress, but also of 
avoiding it where possible and appropriate. Wales has recently established a National Advice 
Network (NAN) including an Information and Advice Quality Framework, but incentives are 
needed to ensure the development of public law legal services; this is difficult when legal aid 
remains a non-devolved subject.   
 
Welsh Tribunals  
Themes of tribunal reform are prevalent across common-law jurisdictions, including merging 
administration, amalgamating jurisdictions, ensuring independence, clarifying onward appeal 
rights, and improving user accessibility.  
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[To ensure the independence of devolved Welsh tribunals, the AJTC Welsh Committee 
recommended that policy and administrative functions should belong with the Department for 
the First Minister and Cabinet, as it has no responsibility for any of the government decisions 
that could be disputed. An Administrative Justice and Tribunals Unit was established within 
the office of the Permanent Secretary, and remains there at the time of writing, renamed the 
Welsh Tribunals Unit (WTU).] [DN: The department is now called the Office of the First 
Minister and Cabinet Office.] The WTU currently has administrative responsibility for eight 
Welsh tribunals and merged administration under its umbrella provides for economies of scale, 
including the centralisation of back-room staff and the adoption of more effective business 
models. Work has also been done to achieve greater consistency between devolved tribunals 
and their HMCTS counterparts. Whilst the WTU does not offer complete independence from 
Government, similar executive units have operated in other UK devolved jurisdictions as 
interim arrangements prior to the establishment of an independent tribunals’ (or eventually a 
courts and tribunals’) service.  
Currently there is a patchwork of onward appeals, some to the Administrative Court and 
others to the Upper Tribunal (both of which have England and Wales jurisdictions; the Upper 
Tribunal also has Great Britain and UK wide jurisdiction over some matters). This patchwork 
is significantly due to the ad hocery of tribunal development as exacerbated by devolution. 
Welsh Government aims to achieve coherence when establishing new tribunals, especially in 
relation to appeal routes from new and existing tribunals.  
There has been ongoing work to harmonise administration and rationalise tribunal 
jurisdictions where possible. CAJTW recommended the amalgamation of school admissions 
and exclusion appeal processes (currently administered by local authorities) with the Special 
Education Needs Tribunal for Wales, creating an Education Tribunal, however Welsh 
Government concluded that this was not feasible, most likely due to the different 
characteristics, caseloads, and modes of operation of the existing bodies.   
The Justice Policy Team and the WTU continue to work on a joint reform programme in 
collaboration with judicial arm’s length bodies. For example, in 2015 arrangements were made 
for the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) to conduct tribunal appointments on behalf 
of the Welsh Ministers, mirroring the arrangement for JAC appointments for the Lord 
Chancellor.  CAJTW recommended that Welsh Government undertake a ‘parity test’ covering 
all devolved Welsh appointments, training, appraisal and discipline ensuring that satisfactory 
standards are in place. However, reforms to judical contracts in England and Wales are likely 
to have unique impacts in Wales where the pool of applicants for judicial posts is smaller 
(Nason 2016a).  
There are ongoing reforms to improve user accessibility through information, advice and 
engagement. The NAN is part of this, as are improvements to tribunal forms, and website 
content and presentation.  
Bangor research and the CAJTW ‘Legacy’ Report recommend that the Lord Chief Justice 
appoint an existing Welsh judge to act as Senior Judicial Lead for devolved Welsh tribunals 
(Nason 2015, para. 7.21; CAJTW 2016, recommendation 7). The ‘Legacy’ Report recommends 
the development of Protocols governing relationships between tribunal Presidents, the Senior 
Judicial Lead (if appointed) and the administration forum to promote greater collaboration, 
sharing of best practice and administrative efficiencies in tribunal administration. Judicial 
leadership is a means to progress the identity and working ethos of tribunals (and courts) 
beyond the simple words of enabling legislation. This has been seen in the case of the Federal 
Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Creyke 2015 and 2017; Groves 2015 and 2017).  
CAJTW recommended that all annual reports of Welsh Government sponsored tribunals be 
presented to Welsh Ministers, be publicised effectively and made available online. These 
recommendations relate to stakeholders’ concerns about a lack of transparency and consistency 
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in administration and standards (Nason 2015, Ch.7). Bangor research noted a continuing lack 
of data, especially about the characteristics and experiences of tribunal users. The benefits of 
tribunal reforms, such as amalgamation, have been assumed across a range of jurisdictions 
without empirical evidence (Nason 2015, Ch.7; Creyke 2015 and 2017; Groves 2015 and 
2017).  
The Wales Bill currently before Parliament makes provision for the status of devolved 
Welsh tribunals. It defines Welsh tribunals as those having functions that do not relate to a 
reserved matter, and which are exercisable only in relation to Wales. Devolved tribunals are 
also listed as Welsh Devolved Authorities, whereas the courts in Wales are not. The ‘justice’ 
reservation, which includes tribunals, has a specific carve-out for Welsh tribunals, allowing 
them to remain as fully devolved institutions. At the time of writing, proposed amendments to 
the Bill would expressly list Welsh Tribunals and establish a President of Welsh Tribunals. 
 
Egalitarianism and hierarchy  
Alongside reforming legislative, court, and tribunal hierarchies, a more egalitarian conception 
of administrative justice can be fostered by promoting greater harmonisation between 
traditional hierarchies and bodies involved more in regulation and value promotion (e.g., the 
PSOW, Welsh Commissioners and civil society institutions).  
Protection of the Welsh language provides an interesting case-study raising structural 
questions about administrative justice and administrative law. The process of establishing the 
WLT, the form of enabling legislation and the policy behind it, have been criticised. Much of 
this centres on the role of the Welsh Language Commissioner (WLC) established by the Welsh 
Language Measure 2007. Some WLC functions emanate from the Welsh Language Act 1993, 
specifically those dealing with Welsh language planning. Others were conferred by the Welsh 
Language (Wales) Measure 2011, including the setting of Welsh language Standards. The 
WLC has own-initiative powers to conduct investigations into matters that raise systematic 
concerns, was appointed by the First Minister, and is accountable to Welsh Government.  
The previous Welsh Language Board was primarily a monitoring body, whereas the 2011 
Measure grants a regulatory role to the WLC; namely to set Standards, take steps to ensure that 
public bodies are complying with them and rectify the situation if not. The 2011 Measure is 
relatively sparse in relation to what rights individuals have in their interactions with public 
bodies. As in many jurisdictions it is common for the detail of administrative law to be fleshed 
out by regulations, or standards developed by government departments and other bodies 
including commissioners and ombudsmen. However, it is questionable whether such a high 
degree of discretion is appropriate in the context of protecting language rights in a bilingual 
nation. Individuals cannot challenge the content of the Standards. The WLC first considers if 
the relevant Standards, set by her office, have been complied with, if a complainant believes 
that there has been a flaw in the WLC’s investigation of compliance with her own Standards 
they can appeal to the WLT. This means that the legislation is primarily addressed to the 
regulator, and those to whom the regulator is accountable, less so to the individuals whose 
language rights the legislation ultimately protects or to the public bodies on whom duties are 
imposed (Huws 2015 and 2017). One alternative is that the WLC should focus on improving 
the delivery of Welsh language policy and promoting and advocating the use of Welsh, whereas 
primary legislation could detail specific linguistic rights, with a right of appeal to the WLT. 
Under the current position language protection takes the format of dispute resolution in a 
regulatory context, as opposed to being enshrined in concrete legal rights. There are concerns 
as to how well this meets the needs of individuals, and it is perhaps this focus on dispute 
resolution over and above rights protection that is most concerning about the ‘new’ model of 
tribunals and of administrative justice in general.   
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The independence and accountability of the WLC has also been a matter of concern. Since 
the WLC is now scrutinising Welsh Government under the Standards, perhaps accountability 
ought to lie with the Assembly? In other jurisdictions language ombudsmen are often 
accountable to their respective legislatures. However, one must also look at the comparative 
functions of these offices. For example, Mac Giolla Chríost notes that the various Canadian 
language commissioners are more ‘ombudsmenesque’ than the WLC in terms of their function 
and their approach (Mac Giolla Chríost 2015 and 2017). The former are designed to receive, 
investigate and report upon, complaints against the executive; they hold the executive to 
account on behalf of the legislature and are therefore accountable to the legislature. On the 
other hand, the WLC has a regulatory function with the power to impose civil penalties; in 
general regulators are accountable to the executive. The difficulty here is that this may 
compromise the independence of the WLC; the office works as a regulator on behalf of Welsh 
Government but is also bound by law to monitor the Government’s compliance with the 2011 
Measure. This problem can be dealt with partially by considering respective functions; as a 
House of Lords Review of regulators has put it: ‘Ministers determine policy and regulators put 
it into effect’ (House of Lords 2007). Though the divide between policy-making and policy-
implementation is not absolute, it could be accepted as sufficient in this context.  
This leaves the problem that the WLC is responsible for monitoring Welsh Government 
compliance with relevant Standards. Mac Giolla Chríost proposes that this separation of 
powers issue might be resolved by removing the individual complaints handling function from 
the WLC, conferring it instead on the PSOW. The PSOW is already the external and 
independent complaint-handling body in relation the Assembly Commission, the body 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the Welsh language services of the Assembly. This 
logic could be extended further by empowering the PSOW to handle Welsh language 
complaints in relation to all Crown bodies and other organisations with similar Crown status. 
The alternative might be to strip the WLC of regulatory functions, but then Wales would 
effectively be left with two language ombudsmen without any obvious justification.  
It is difficult to precisely delineate the functions of specific institutions; but if functionality 
alone cannot resolve concerns of principle (e.g., meeting the needs and protecting the rights of 
citizens, independence and accountability) then checks and balances become increasingly 
important. Whilst tribunals and courts provide first instance redress to individuals, they also 
check and balance the powers of other institutions.    
The WLT, the first Welsh tribunal to be established by Assembly legislation, has an 
important role in counterbalancing the WLC’s limited independence from Welsh Government. 
However, as of June 2013 the First Minister became the holder of the Welsh language policy 
portfolio, and the Office of the First Minister and Cabinet Office (to whom the WTU is 
accountable) is accountable to the First Minister. The First Minister was also involved in setting 
the WLT Rules and these Rules were, as a matter of fact, ‘Made’ by the President of the 
Tribunal and ‘Allowed’, in the statutory sense, by the First Minister. The WLC acts as an agent 
of Welsh Government in delivering Welsh language policy whilst at the same time monitoring 
compliance of Welsh Government with that policy. From the perspective of principle, this 
situation was not fully resolved by the establishment of the WLT as the same Welsh 
Government Minister appointed the WLC and the WLT President, (though the latter was 
through a process agreed with the Lord Chief Justice and the Judicial Appointments 
Commission), as well as approving the Rules of latter and being responsible for the democratic 
oversight of it. This Welsh Government Minister also had responsibility for setting the Welsh 
language Standards upon which the WLT would be called to adjudicate in cases of dispute 
between that Minister and the WLC. In May 2016, the Welsh Language portfolio was 
transferred to the Minister for Lifelong Learning and Welsh Language, this is some 
improvement going forwards, but it does not cure the independence issues arising when the 
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WLT Rules were made, when the current WLC and WLT President were appointed, or when 
Welsh language Standards were set.   
The WLC, alongside other Welsh commissioners, is part of the so-called ‘integrity branch’ 
of state, which also includes recent innovations in accountability such as ombudsmen, 
regulators and auditors. The proposed ‘integrity branch’ spans parliamentary mechanisms of 
control and executive mechanisms of self-control (Buck et al 2010). A conceptual conundrum 
is whether this branch is separable from the legislature, executive and judiciary; whilst the 
institutions comprising it are novel, their powers and accountability are derived from the 
traditional three branches and therefore contingent upon them. An alternative view is that the 
integrity institutions are too varied to comprise a coherent fourth branch; instead their hybrid 
legal-political nature assists in promoting administrative justice as a cross-cutting 
constitutional principle (Gill 2014). Integrity is however, not the sole preserve of innovative 
institutions; it must also be exhibited by the traditional three pillars. A more detailed 
examination of what exactly is meant by ‘integrity’ is required than can be achieved here; but 
values of fairness, procedural due process, democracy and equality, as enshrined in the Bangor 
and CAJTW principles, provide a good starting point.   
The development of ‘integrity branch’ institutions nevertheless raises the concern that rather 
than providing additional routes to administrative justice, they may offer thrifty alternatives to 
traditional court and tribunal-based adjudication over matters of legal right, representing access 
to justice on the cheap in times of austerity (Nason 2015, para 4.18). Continuing research into 
their effectiveness is therefore especially important.  
In Wales there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to the roles, accountability and effectiveness 
of ‘integrity branch’ institutions. For example, the Children’s Commissioner and the Older 
People’s Commissioner perform functions more akin to National Human Rights Institutions, 
whereas the WLC is a regulator. Recent research about Children’s and Older People’s 
Commissioners found that they have a key role of sign-posting people to more relevant sources 
of assistance (Sherlock and Williams 2015 and 2017). Whilst this may help to plug gaps in 
advice services or lack of awareness of advice services, it raises questions about the 
effectiveness and accessibility of existing mechanisms. Should it be the Commissioners’ role 
to assist people in accessing what ought to be user-friendly procedures, and is this an effective 
use of resources? It seems that the Commissioner’s capacity to ‘name and shame’ may 
sometimes have made the difference in cases that were not resolved by local authority internal 
complaint/review mechanisms. A further question is then how the Commissioners decide 
which cases to pursue; if they are necessarily selective in doing so this can damage their 
reputation among specific groups. The same might be said of ombudsmen using own-initiative 
powers. Research on What people expect from ombudsmen in the UK (Creutzfeldt 2015) 
concluded that people generally have too high expectations of ombudsmen from the outset. 
Selectivity in which cases to pursue, and confusion over function and accountability, may 
tarnish the initial image of ‘integrity branch’ institutions as being part of a more egalitarian 
culture.  
 
From fatalism to egalitarianism: engaging users  
Reforms to the hierarchy (legislature, courts and tribunals) and the growth of the ‘integrity 
branch’ are part of improving user engagement with the administrative justice system and 
facilitating expression of the citizen voice characteristic of a more egalitarian model. Wales is 
also fostering an egalitarian culture by reforming approaches to complaint handling across a 
range of public bodies. This can be seen in health and social care where attempts are first made 
to secure local and informal resolution, followed by a formal investigation conducted by an 
independent investigator and a complaint to the PSOW if the other methods fail (The National 
Health Service (Concerns, Complaints and Redress Arrangements) (Wales) Regulations 2011 
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and The Social Services Complaints Procedure (Wales) Regulations 2014). Wales was the first 
UK nation to equate judgement in social work to clinical judgement in health and bring both 
under the PSOW’s remit.  
The earlier years of the NHS in Wales concerns process, Putting Things Right (PTR), 
demonstrate how difficult such harmony is to achieve. A wide-ranging review concluded that 
not enough resources had been made available to allow for the effective management of PTR 
on a national and local level, and that there were at least ten different versions in play as Trusts 
and Health Boards had implemented it according to their own budgets (Evans 2014). 
Navigation through the system, including which point to access and when, and when a 
complaint reverted to a legal process was not easy for either staff or users to describe. The 
Report made 109 recommendations about how the NHS in Wales could improve its complaint 
handling. In response, the Assembly Health and Social Care Committee undertook a further 
inquiry, and the Minister for Health and Social Services reported that Health Boards and Trusts 
had begun to take steps addressing issues of resources and leadership, and improving the 
timeliness of responding to complaints. Other developments include ensuring that the patient’s 
voice is central to the process, with some hospitals piloting a new approach, iWantGreatCare, 
to capture patient feedback online. Further work has also been done by the National Quality 
and Safety Forum looking at; information/data and publication of concerns, putting things right 
guidance and communication, and learning from outcomes. The Minister rejected the 
recommendation to establish a national independent complaints regulator (what would in effect 
be a new ‘integrity’ institution) preferring instead to give the Welsh NHS time to demonstrate 
improvement in its handling of concerns.  
Implementation of the Evans Report must be viewed alongside reforms to improve the 
quality of services provided by the NHS in Wales, as well as the governance and accountability 
of relevant organisations and people who manage them. Other proposals include, consideration 
of a statutory duty of candour to drive a culture of openness and honesty, and further alignment 
of health and social care complaints processes to provide a seamless service to people wishing 
to raise concerns (Welsh Government 2015, pp. 4–5).  
The PSOW has jurisdiction over concerns and complaints across devolved public services 
in Wales; a caseload that has increased over the last ten years, not least due to austerity and an 
ageing population. The draft Public Services Ombudsman for Wales (PSOW) Bill issued by 
the National Assembly for Wales Finance Committee during the Fourth Assembly includes a 
provision for own-initiative powers; such are common across Europe and would allow the 
PSOW to investigate potential systematic failings without waiting for an individual complaint.  
The PSOW has developed a Model Concerns and Complaints Policy and Guidance, but this is 
not mandatory, whereas guidance produce by the Scottish Complaints Standards Agency 
(CSA) in association with the SPSO, is mandatory in relation to listed public bodies in 
Scotland. The PSOW Bill includes a similar CSA function for the PSOW. Thompson suggests 
that this could instigate a cultural change under which networks of sector specific complaints 
handlers take ownership of seeking to identify, share, and apply, insights to improve their 
services (Thompson 2015 and 2017).   
CAJTW recommended that Welsh Government review whether the complaints and appeals 
system in Wales contains any significant gaps (CAJTW 2016, recommendation 6) and whether 
some existing standards are being operated in the spirit in which they were made. In response, 
Welsh Government stated that providing ‘for fair, efficient and proportionate systems of 
dispute resolution is embedded into the…initial stages of the policy assessment process’. 
However, it accepted that, ‘the complaints and appeals system has evolved over time, the 
network is complex and there is no mapped overview’ (Welsh Government 2016b).  
 
Avoiding new and opaque bureaucracies  
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In many jurisdictions increasing resort to the ‘integrity branch’ comes alongside greater 
emphasis on administrative rather than legal processes to resolve disputes, avoid escalation and 
promote learning within public bodies.  
The growth of internal and external administrative review is of concern because it remains 
under-explored, under-regulated, fragmented, and devoid of overarching principles (Thomas 
2016). This is true both at the UK and devolved Welsh level.    
Mandatory internal reviews are contentious because of their tendency towards a new form 
of bureaucratic rationality in the context of austerity. As with complaints and appeals, there is 
no specific ‘map’ of the internal review processes operated by Welsh public bodies. Across the 
UK internal review is most commonly experienced in social security where it is mandatory 
before a tribunal appeal, and in immigration where it has replaced tribunal and court appeal 
rights in most cases. Wales has a higher proportion of people claiming some form of in-work 
benefit than the UK average (Nason 2015, para. 3.25). One would think therefore that 
Mandatory Reconsideration (MR) in social security cases is a key part of administrative justice 
in Wales, even if the inertia of the fatalist culture tends to suggest lower take up of review 
processes than seen in other UK nations.  
Under MR people aggrieved by government decisions concerned with 22 types of benefits 
are required to ask for MR (within one month of the date of the initial decision) before pursuing 
other redress mechanisms. The claimant asks the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
to reconsider its original decision. Claimants must lodge their appeals directly with HMCTS. 
The aims of introducing MR include, resolving disputes and correcting decisions as early as 
possible, preventing escalation thus reducing delays and costs, and reducing unnecessary 
demand on HMCTS by resolving more disputes internally. MR was contentious from the start 
with concerns about proposals to withhold benefits whilst the review was underway, the length 
and fairness of the process, and its impact on dissuading applicants from pursuing meritorious 
appeals. Following a consultation, the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) produced 
an Occasional Paper on Decision Making and Mandatory Reconsideration (SSCA 2016). 
Among its recommendations were; the need to review current MR time limits, improving MR 
notices including signposting appeal rights, review training for decision-makers, improve 
guidance making it easier to navigate the system, improve communication by use of secure 
email, and recommendations for specific types of claim especially in relation to medical 
evidence. 
A common cross-jurisdictional problem is that data on the outcomes of various stages of 
administrative justice redress is often insufficient to be able to assess the quality of specific 
processes. The SSAC noted that data on MR is limited and that full and robust statistics about 
success rates and waiting times should be developed. The data problem is particularly acute 
from the Welsh perspective; where data is available it is often published on an aggregated 
England and Wales basis. In relation to all aspects of the administrative justice system, Bangor 
and CAJTW recommended that Welsh data be separately identified and publicised where 
appropriate (Nason 2015, pp. 6–7; CAJTW 2016, recommendation 33).   
The SSAC report refers to a DWP pilot to collect and analyse tribunal feedback. This kind 
of organisational learning is especially important to a ‘holistic’ understanding of administrative 
justice. The SSAC recommended improving transparency about how feedback is being used to 
improve decision-making. In relation to devolved Welsh tribunals and the Administrative 
Court in Wales, Bangor research suggests that the comparatively smaller realm of governance 
and caseloads may make feedback loops easier to operate (Nason 2015, Chs.7 and 8); but such 
processes must be as transparent as possible to ensure trust in the hierarchy.  
 
Reconstructing administrative justice  
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Wales faces challenges in developing a more egalitarian conception of administrative justice. 
Whilst Scotland voted to remain within the EU, a majority in Wales voted for [Wexit?]. This, 
alongside the election of seven UKIP AMs to the Fifth Assembly, suggests a population 
increasingly unhappy with current styles of governance. Wales remains vulnerable to UK-wide 
austerity and the marketization of decision-making and redress. The current Wales Bill does 
not represent a great step forward for Wales both politically and legally. On the wider scale, 
Brexit, and the growth of nationalism in the US and in some EU nations, may suggest a move 
away from administrative justice as a global phenomenon with global values. Not least because 
global administrative law has sometimes been understood as a Western, individualist, liberal 
and capitalist project (Harlow 2006); part of the hierarchy to be dismantled.   
Some of these developments reflect that much Anglo-American, legal and political culture 
remains based on ‘scepticism, deconstruction, and relativism’ (Guest 2012, p.252). However, 
a new egalitarian conception of administrative justice, nascent in Wales, need not exhibit these 
features. CAJTW and Bangor principles show that we have ideals; the continued search for 
principled consistency indicative of ongoing reform shows that we have not yet succumbed to 
the fragmentation of relativism; and our method is constructivist, working incrementally 
between values and lived institutional experiences.  
Adopting a more constructivist methodology is a way forward for administrative justice in 
general. Our focus should be on incremental studies anchored in empirical socio-legal methods, 
especially those assessing the effectiveness of newer institutions and procedures. It is from 
these incremental studies that we can construct new conceptions of administrative justice.   
Wales is particularly suited as a petri-dish for trialling new approaches. Chief among these 
may be to work with the grain of existing institutions, focusing on vertical accountability by 
emphasising partnerships and feedback loops including at the local government level (where 
reform is already underway in Wales) (Thompson 2015 and 2017). The PSOW, and to some 
extent the Administrative Court in Wales, act as ‘one stop shops’, and the smaller scale of 
governance may allow for more effective communication with the Assembly and Welsh 
Government departments than can be achieved at a Westminster level.  
The broader notion of horizontal as well as vertical ‘holistic’ administrative justice is not 
lost in Wales. Horizontal in this regard means across all branches of state, and all subject 
matters of governance. Work is being done to harmonise complaints mechanisms across public 
bodies. Further efforts can also be made to reduce inconsistency in redress, at least with respect 
to rights and responsibilities created under devolved powers. CAJTW recommended that 
Welsh Government introduce guidance and minimum standards for the operation of ad hoc 
redress schemes ensuring conformity and consistency in principle (CAJTW 2016, 
recommendation 16). Bangor and CAJTW recommended ‘mapping’ the Welsh administrative 
justice system, to identify gaps, overlaps, areas of good practice and inefficiencies. This would 
be best achieved on a ‘sectoral’ (incremental) basis, as has been done for Scotland by the 
Scottish Tribunals and Administrative Justice Advisory Council (STAJAC 2015). 
Understanding how to make the best use of lawyers and other advice providers should also be 
part of this project, as their roles need not necessarily remain as currently perceived.  
In many jurisdictions, less traditional routes to accountability are proliferating, especially 
institutions forming part of the so-called ‘integrity branch’. I believe there is merit in focusing 
on integrity as the foundation for a vertical and horizontal cross-cutting constitutional principle 
of administrative justice, or indeed of a constitutional right to administrative justice. CAJTW 
characterises administrative justice as a ‘fundamental right’ cohering with the AJTC 
recommendation that any developing British Bill of Rights should include a right to 
administrative justice. If integrity is foundational, a continued and open conversation about its 
meaning is required, especially in this ‘post truth’ era. Whilst the work of Ronald Dworkin is 
often misunderstood, I think integrity should be understood in the Dworkinian sense of aiming 
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to ensure that citizens are treated with equal concern for their welfare, and with equal respect 
for their individuality. Everyone has an ‘eponymous public law right to be treated with equal 
concern and respect, that is to be treated as equal in one’s humanity’ (Nason 2016c, p. 224). It 
is this understanding of egalitarianism that underscores the Bangor Principles and which is 
therefore carried forward into the CAJTW Principles and related recommendations. Adopting 
similar principles, reforming traditional hierarchies, making the best use of value-promoting 
institutions and better engaging users, will assist other jurisdictions in challenging times.   
 
 
Acknowledgements  
With thanks to Brian Thompson and Huw Pritchard for their comments on earlier drafts. 
 
Disclosure statement  
The Bangor research cited in this article was funded by the Welsh Government, views 
expressed here are those of the author alone. 
 
 
References 
Adler, M. (2003) A Socio-Legal Approach to Administrative Justice. Law and Policy, 25, 323–
4. 
AJTC. (2010). Developing Principles of Administrative Justice.  
— — (2012). Putting it Right: A Strategic Approach to Resolving Administrative Disputes.   
Asimow, M. (2016). Five Models of Administrative Adjudication. Cambridge Public Law 
Conference. 
CAJTW. (March 2016). Administrative Justice: A Cornerstone of Social Justice in Wales  
Buck, T., Kirkham., R. and Thompson, B. (2010). The Ombudsman Enterprise and 
Administrative Justice. Routledge.  
Cowan, D., Dymond A., Halliday S. and Hunter C. Reconsidering Mandatory Reconsideration, 
forthcoming Public Law. 
 
Creutzfeldt, N. (2015). What People Expect from Ombudsmen in the UK (available at:  
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/uk_report_final.pdf 
Creyke, R. (2015) Amalgamation of Tribunals:  Whether ‘tis Better … ? . Bangor University 
Administrative Justice Conference and forthcoming in Nason (ed). (2017). Administrative 
Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives. University of Wales Press. 
Douglas, M. (1978) Cultural Bias. Occasional Paper no. 35, Royal Anthropological  
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. 
Dworkin, R. (1998). Law’ s Empire. new edn. Hart Publishing.  
Evans, K. (2014). A Review of Complaints (Concerns) Handling in the NHS: “Using the Gift 
of Complaints”.  
Gardner, D. (2016). Administrative Law and the Administrative Court in Wales. University of 
Wales Press. 
Gill, C. (2014). The evolving role of the ombudsman: a conceptual and constitutional analysis 
of the “Scottish Solution” to administrative justice. Public Law, 662.  
Groves, M. (2015). Administrative Justice Without Lawyers? Unrepresented Parties in 
Australian Tribunals. Bangor University Administrative Justice Conference and 
forthcoming in Nason (ed). (2017). Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative 
Perspectives. University of Wales Press. 
  18 
Halliday, S. (2004) Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.  
— — and Scott, C. (2010). A Cultural Analysis of Administrative Justice. in Adler. M, (ed), 
Administrative Justice in Context. Hart Publishing.  
Hare, I. (1995). The Law Commission and Judicial Review: Principle Versus Pragmatism. 
Cambridge Law Journal, 54, 2, 268.  
Hertogh, M. (2015). Promoting Administrative Justice in an Age of Discontent: The Mixed 
Success of the National Ombudsman in the Netherlands. Bangor University, Administrative 
Justice Conference.  
House of Lords, Select Committee on Regulators. (2007).UK economic regulators. Volume 1 
Report. The Stationery Office. 
Huws, C. (2015). Administrative Justice and the Welsh Language (Wales) Measure 2011. 
Bangor University, Administrative Justice Conference and forthcoming in Nason (ed). 
(2017). Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives. University of Wales 
Press. 
Judiciary of England and Wales. (2016). The Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2015.  
Law Commission (2016). Form and Accessibility of the Law Applicable in Wales. Law Com 
No. 366.   
Mac Giolla Chríost, D. (2015). Language Commissioners and their Independence. Bangor 
University Administrative Justice Conference and forthcoming in Nason (ed). 2017. 
Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives. University of Wales Press. 
Mashaw, J. (1983). Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security and Disability Claims. 
Yale University Press. 
Nason, S. (2015). Understanding Administrative Justice in Wales (available at 
http://adminjustice2015.bangor.ac.uk/documents/full-report.pdf) 
– – (2016a). Judicial review at the 2016 Legal Wales Conference’ UKAJO Blog. (available at 
https://ukaji.org) 
– – (2016b). Justice Outside London? An Update on ‘Regional’ Judicial Review. U.K. Const. 
L. Blog (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/). 
– – (2016c). Reconstructing Judicial Review. Hart Publishing 2016. 
 
O’Brien, N. (2012). Administrative Justice: A Libertarian Cinderella in Search of an 
Egalitarian Prince. The Political Quarterly, 83, 3, 494. 
Sherlock, A. and Williams, J. (2015). The Children’s Commissioner for Wales and the Older 
People’s Commissioner for Wales and the Administrative Justice System. Bangor 
University Administrative Justice Conference and forthcoming in Nason (ed) (2017). 
Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives. University of Wales Press.   
Social Security Advisory Committee produced (2016) Occasional Paper on Decision Making 
and Mandatory Reconsideration.  
Sterett, S. (1997). Creating Constitutionalism? The Politics of Legal Expertise and 
Administrative Law in England and Wales. Michigan University Press 1997. 
Thomas, R. (2016). Current Developments in UK Tribunals: Challenges for Administrative 
Justice (available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766982) 
forthcoming in Nason (ed). (2017). Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative 
Perspectives. University of Wales Press.  
Thompson, B. (2015). Opportunities and Constraints: Reflections on Reforming 
Administrative Justice Within and Across the UK. Bangor University Administrative Justice 
Conference and forthcoming in Nason (ed). (2017). Administrative Justice in Wales and 
Comparative Perspectives. University of Wales Press.  
Thompson, M., Ellis, R. & Wildavsky, A. (1990). Cultural Theory. Westview Press. 
  19 
Tollenaar, A. (2017). Maintaining Administrative Justice in the Dutch Regulatory Welfare 
State in Nason (ed). (2017). Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative Perspectives. 
University of Wales Press.  
Thornberg, E. (2011). Reaping What We Sow: Anti-litigation Rhetoric, Limited Budgets, and 
Declining Support for Civil Courts. Civil Justice Quarterly, 30, 1, 74. 
UK Government (2015). Powers for a Purpose: Towards a Lasting Devolution Settlement for 
Wales. Cm 9020. 
Wales Governance Centre. (2016). Justice in Wales: Principles, Progress and Next Steps  
– – and the Constitution Unit (2016). Challenge and Opportunity: The Draft Wales Bill 2015.  
Welsh Government (2014). Devolution, Democracy and Delivery: Improving public services 
for people in Wales. 
– – (2015). Our Health, Our Health Services Green Paper. 
– – (2016a). Government and Laws in Wales Bill.  
– – (2016b). Response to CAJTW Legacy Report.  
Williams, P. (2014). Commission on Public Service Governance and Delivery.  
 
 
 
 
 
